Policy of appeasement

By Noralyn Mustafa

THE REPUBLICAN Party was in power in Washington for the first 13 years of the American presence in the Philippines. The Democrats, who had opposed the American colonization and vigorously proposed independence for the Philippines, gained a majority in the House of Representatives in March 1911.

The election of Woodrow Wilson two years later as president of the United States marked a change in policy in the Philippines that facilitated Filipino participation in their government, with the objective of granting them independence as soon as possible.

Wilson appointed Francis Burton Harrison as governor general of the Philippines. In accordance with the stand of the US Congress Forbes pursued policies that would pave the way for "the ultimate independence of the islands."

The entire Philippine civil service was transformed with a policy of "Filipinization," which was fully supported by Gov. Frank W. Carpenter. With his remarkable performance in public office which was described as "incalculably great service," Carpenter was appointed governor of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu, and shortly after, the Philippines Free Press even wrote of him as "a marvel of efficiency."

Highlights of Carpenter's administration were "the gradual unification of the structure and powers of provincial and municipal governments in Moroland with those in Luzon and the Visayas; Filipinization of government personnel; assumption of the civil government of complete responsibility for the maintenance of public order; further extension of government control over regions inhabited by Moros and pagans; further stimulation and development of the natural resources, industry, commerce and agriculture of Moroland; and continued development of the social, political and material conditions of the Moros and pagans with a view to their rapid amalgamation with the inhabitants of the other islands."

This was the essence of Carpenter's "policy of attraction," which involved the reduction of the American military presence, acceleration of the economic, political and social improvement of the people, promotion of greater Moro participation in governmental affairs; the integration of the Moro and pagan inhabitants into the body politic of the Philippine nation; and winning their acceptance of, or at least acquiescence in, the collection of taxes, the operation of schools, the abdication of the Sultan of Sulu, and the presence of Christian Filipino officials in positions of authority among them (Peter Gowing, Mandate in Moroland, 1977).

Probably inspired by the success of the Carpenter administrative policies, the Marcos martial law government in the late '70s embarked on its own "policy of attraction" to seduce members of the Moro National Liberation Front to lay down their arms and "return to the fold of the law," a euphemism for surrender.

But this time the government was no longer dealing with kris-waving homicidal savages who became "good" only when rigor mortis had set in, facilitated by the caliber .45 pistol that had been expressly invented for this purpose.

Now the adversary was a large well-organized army led by generally young, educated highly motivated ideologues equipped with high-powered arms and explosives provided by sympathetic foreign governments and organizations.

Upon advice, the new policy direction was renamed the "policy of reconciliation," i.e., brothers torn apart by a quarrel who kiss and make up.

Mosques and madaris were established; Muslim holidays were made official, at least in "Muslim-dominated" areas; even civil service rules were modified with the institution of the "unassembled" mechanism. And there were the so-called "impact projects" to fast-track construction of long-neglected infrastructure in Mindanao and Sulu.

But in truth and in fact, this policy could be more accurately called the policy of appeasement.

As early as the first batch of surrenderers called the "Magic 8" and their followers (quickly labeled by the Tausugs as "balikbayan"), towns were partitioned into several municipalities so that everybody could have a chance at being mayor. Even new provinces were created.

Erstwhile "commanders" were awarded government positions, regardless of qualifications. Surrendered firearms were paid, and even cash dole-outs were distributed for "livelihood projects."

And for the benefit especially of the MNLF's foreign patrons, Marcos set up the Lupong Tagapagpaganap ng Pook which later had to be divided into IX and XII, because the Tausugs, the Maranaos and the Maguindanaoans could not agree on who would be chairman of the new layer of local governance.

When Corazon Aquino took power, she and her own team of strategists, to realize her martyred husband's wish for a final resolution of the Moro insurgency problem, created, through a constitutional amendment, a consultative assembly and finally, a plebiscite, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.

But has it succeeded? Did any of the past efforts at appeasement succeed?

Frank Carpenter's policy of attraction was directed at the general populace of "Moros and pagans."

The policy of appeasement, to include the 1996 GRP-MNLF peace agreement, were a series of transactions between the government and the so-called insurgents. Nowhere, whether in the agreement or in the accruing benefits thereof were the people of any significant consideration.

And there lies a world, or more accurately, a century, of difference.

Comments to nm19@my.smart.com.ph