(First of three parts)

MANILA, Philippines—On the morning of July 27, 2003, officials of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) greeted cadets in the mess hall a “Happy Sunday.”

It was a usual greeting at the country’s premier military school at Fort del Pilar in Baguio City. But it was not a usual day.

Before dawn that Sunday, five years ago, more than 90 junior officers—PMA graduates as recent as 2002—occupied the posh Oakwood apartments in Makati City, along with 250 of their men, to protest corruption in the government and the military.

Snipers were deployed at the hotel’s rooftop and the perimeter areas were rigged with explosives.

The group demanded the resignation of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, then Defense Secretary Angelo Reyes and Brig. Gen. Victor Corpus, then chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP).

Wearing red armbands that bore a white sun and the ancient letter “K,” the group was named “Magdalo,” after the Katipunan faction led by Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo, which revolted against Spanish colonizers.

At the PMA that fateful day, officials did not dwell on Oakwood, but instead reminded the cadets that they had to “study, study, and study, and be good officers,” recalls Air Force 2nd Lt. Aiross Soria, then a plebe.

Since then, the 22-year-old says, the Magdalo issue had been a recurring topic at the PMA, especially when one of the rebel leaders, then Navy Lt. Antonio Trillanes IV, ran for the Senate last year and won with more than 11 million votes.

Soria remembers PMA Superintendent Maj. Gen. Leopoldo Maligalig repeatedly urging cadets to “leave politics to the politicians.”

Now detailed at the AFP public information office, Soria is careful not to question the motives of her “sirs”—as PMA upperclassmen are addressed. She says one thing she has learned from the failed mutiny was “to always reconcile one’s idealism with reality.”

Struggling to rebuild

Soria knows the AFP is still struggling to rebuild itself after years of neglect.

For example, she patiently waits for her turn to train at the Air Force Flying School in Fernando Air Base in Lipa City in Batangas, where she grew up watching planes do air acrobatics. It could take a while. There’s simply not enough trainer aircraft, officials say.

The Philippine Air Force’s dismal pilot-to-aircraft ratio was among the issues raised in the Oakwood mutiny that an independent commission sought to address in its 148-page report.

Formed by Ms Arroyo, the commission headed by former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano was tasked to look into the grievances aired by the mutineers and make recommendations to prevent another such uprising.

Among the other issues raised by the Magdalo as outlined in the commission report were the AFP’s questionable Retirement and Separation Benefits System (RSBS), its procurement system, military modernization, the state of the AFP medical services, and benefits for relatives of soldiers killed in action.

Air assets more expensive

Certainly, air assets are “much more expensive than the norm,” says Defense Secretary Gilbert Teodoro Jr. That’s why, he says, the government takes extra care in acquiring aircraft. There’s also not enough funding available.

The need for more resources to keep the PAF operational in a regime of soaring oil prices, devastating natural disasters and continuing insurgency is “a more pressing concern,” Teodoro says.

But generally, five years since the Magdalo officers denounced the sorry state of the AFP, the military leadership thinks the AFP is in a much better shape.

“There’s a big improvement and we’re looking up in terms of capability development,” says Air Force Maj. Gen. Gilbert Llanto, AFP deputy chief of staff for plans.

But if last year’s Nov. 29 Peninsula Manila hotel takeover was any indication, Trillanes and the Magdalo officers still maintain that nothing much has been done since Oakwood. Several dozen Magdalo rebels had walked out of their trial and taken over the Peninsula in a short-lived attempt to ignite a “people power” revolt.

Systemic change a dream

For Trillanes, the government has not been able to meet any of the Magdalo demands. Then and now, the Magdalo insists what they dream for the country is a systemic change, in the government and within Filipinos themselves.

Answering questions sent by the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Trillanes says the Magdalo’s demands remain the same: “Change in the way our country is being run. With that, the day we see good governance being practiced by our national leaders will be the day the Magdalo will lose its relevance in society.”

The rebels say pervasive indifference among Filipinos has become a social malady itself.

“What we need is value formation … and a system that would come after corrupt people in the AFP and the government,” says Navy Lt. Eugene Gonzalez, one of the rebel officers undergoing court-martial.

Major General Llanto says the Oakwood mutineers may have seen an AFP that was merely 30 percent capable in 2003. He admits that other officers and men shared the frustrations voiced by the rebels.

When the mutiny happened, the AFP had barely recovered from an all-out war declared by then President Joseph Estrada against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in 2000 and an offensive in 2003 in the MILF’s Buliok Complex in Pikit, North Cotabato—campaigns where the Magdalo soldiers saw action.

‘A moot event’

The AFP did not only reel from a high death toll. Tired and weary field officers and men also had to make do with whatever resources were left from the offensives while ranking officials were living it up and had their own political agendas, say the rebels.

Anger and frustration led to Oakwood.

“There’s a capacity [for] idealism embedded in each officer’s heart … but there are so many ways of achieving change. You can kick the sleeping dogs or you find a way around them. But in the case of the Magdalo, they chose to kick the sleeping dogs. It’s just a question of techniques,” Llanto says.

Teodoro considers Oakwood a “moot event” today because he believes the AFP has become a united force, but adds the mutiny may have had some contributions that led to a wake-up call in the military.

“However, the issues at Oakwood pertained to that period of time. Right now, we face different dynamic issues in terms of difficulties of global economies which directly affect our operations, climate change which is really a big concern, and finally, the ever-changing face of global terrorism,” he says.

Llanto points out that aside from improving military capability, the AFP has also been focusing on developing its military doctrines and human resources, to name a few.

Capability upgrade

The military has revised the AFP Modernization Act of 1995 into a Capability Upgrade Program (CUP) “that put it in the proper perspective,” giving primacy to internal security operations, says Llanto.

Trillanes sees the non-implementation of the “highly flawed” modernization law as a blessing in disguise for the AFP.

“The capability upgrade is more practical and directly addresses the present requirements of the AFP,” he says.

Llanto notes that no funds had been released for the modernization program that involved big-ticket items, such as those for air defense system, offshore patrol vessels, and a lot of things for the Army.

It was not until 2000, four years since the law was passed, that some P28 billion for the AFP modernization was released, which came mainly from proceeds of sales or leases of military land from the Bases Conversion Development Authority.

The law provides that the AFP was supposed to receive P350 billion from the national government spread through 15 years.

3-phase program

Under the CUP, Llanto’s office audits the capabilities of the troops and their adeptness at offsetting threats, and determines what soldiers need in the field to be effective.

The CUP was divided into three phases—Horizons 1, 2 and 3.

Horizon 1 began in 2004 and would end in 2010, when Ms Arroyo completes her term and the AFP should have made a decisive success against the communist New People’s Army.

Horizon 2 will see the AFP’s six-year transition to territorial defense against external threats for which the AFP was established in the first place, although it was unclear where this would come from.

Horizon 3 means the AFP shall have entered the era of territorial defense, “the real modernization,” when it will be equipped against external aggressors, according to Llanto.

Each Horizon is for six years to allow for transition and avoid a disruption of policy direction, Llanto says.

Horizon 1, which focuses on the “move, shoot and communicate” capabilities of the troops, has been divided into two phases, mainly for budgetary reasons.

At the very least, with some P12 billion spent under the first phase of Horizon 1, the military’s service commands have been receiving some new and better equipment. Another P22 billion has been earmarked for Phase 2 that would include acquisitions for the troops’ better mobility.

Llanto says that if the AFP acquires all the equipment specified in Horizon 1, it will be able to improve its capability level to 70 percent. (To be continued tomorrow)