Before Rambo & Gringo there was ROCKY

JUST like the movies, before Rambo, there was Rocky.

Rocky is three-star general Rafael M. Ileto. He is now 65. Rocky’s hair is white and thinning, though the strides are still brisk and the “punches” well preserved.

What Rocky has is more in spirit than in the fist. When the spirit moves him, he can say no even if everyone else says yes as what happened on Jan. 27, 1971 — repeat, Jan. 27, 1971 and not Sept. 21. 1972 — inside then President Ferdinand Marcos’ study room in Malacanang where Marcos had announced he would declare martial law the next day, and Rocky knocked him out.

It was the hottest night of student activism. Marcos had delivered his State of the Nation address that day, the firebrands, too, with their own version, that night in Mendiola. They rammed a firetruck through the Palace’s gates, burned other vehicles in the vicinity. “Marcos was shaken, mad, angry.” Marcos may be a soldier with 27 medals, but that night, “he called us to his study room. We were all in fatigues — Gen. Manuel Yan, then chief of staff; Gen. Raval of the Philippine Constabulary, Gen. Romeo Espino, all the commanding generals. Defense Secretary Ernesto Mata came late. We were wondering, what for? It was one o’clock in the morning. Marcos said, ‘I’m going to declare martial law tomorrow, I will impose a six to six curfew.’ Marcos was very serious. He wanted us to implement his order.”

Marcos asked the generals present if their respective commands were ready. Gen. Ileto was then the commanding general of the Philippine Army, then as now, the prime major service unit. “Gen. Yan said, ‘Yes, Sir’, and so did Espino and Raval … when my turn came, I told the President ‘No, Sir’. And he asked why not? And I said, The army is not ready, Sir.”

Rocky smiles: “Actually, it was my polite way of saying martial law is not the answer to the country’s problems. The problem was political, but how could a military man say that to the President’s face? I didn’t want him to think I was meddling.” Anyway, Rocky insisted for reconsideration.

The Philippine Army, he told Marcos, was under reorganization.

Marcos did not declare martial law the next day. Rocky’s star would wane from that time on.

Eight months later, Marcos called Gen. Ileto informing him that the army’s reorganization will be implemented. The military areas were renamed military zones. Gen. Ileto was replaced by Gen. Zagala. “I lost my command,” Rocky smiles. But he was promoted as deputy chief of staff, a ceremonial position. “My primary task was mobilization.” In 1974, Gen. Ileto was given his third star and the title vice-chief of staff, also a title which invoked awesome authority, when in reality there was none.

Rocky describes his former Commander-in-Chief: “Marcos is the kind of a Commander-in-Chief who wants his staff to say yes to him. He thinks that should be because he is very intelligent. Maybe he thought I was too independent-minded. I spoke my mind, I wanted to be heard.” There was one man “a nobody” — whom Rocky remembers as dutifully following every Marcos’ word and was therefore well-rewarded: Fabian C. Ver who later was named chief of staff.

The aborted martial law in January was not Rocky’s first “offense”. In the late 60s, Rocky objected to Oplan Jabidah, a military operation designed to destabilize Sabah over which the government was claming territorial jurisdiction. Rocky thought it was unethical, not proper to do. The plan was exposed in 1969 when the Jabidah trainees, irked over delayed salaries and measly food allowance, mutineed in their training camp in Corregidor. Rocky laughs over that one: “You know who got the ax!”

Marcos was not one to let Rocky go scot-free. Marcos did not forget. After the January confrontation, “I was slowly eased out.” When Marcos with then Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile and their “12 disciples” hatched Oplan Sagittarius, Rocky was out of the circle. “I knew all about it,” he says though. “But I could not stop them.” Oplan Sagittarius was the code for martial law, signed Sept. 21, 1972, and implemented the next day.

Rocky wants to set the record straight: “No, I was never a member of the so-called ‘12 disciples.’ I objected to martial law only in 1971, not in 1972 as what has been written about.”

The man who said no to martial law was born on Oct. 24, 1920 in San Isidro, Nueva Ecija. Childhood was spent in Nueva Ecija and it was not until he finished high school that Rocky moved to Manila.

A military career was uppermost in his mind. In his second year at the University of the Philippines College of Engineering, he took the entrance exam for the Philippine Military Academy. He excelled as a plebe, was rewarded with a scholarship to the U.S. military academy in West Point from where he graduated in 1943. From there, it was to the Pacific — in New Guinea, in Saipan, and finally Bataan — where the action was, with the famed Alamo Scouts of the U.S. Sixth Army.

The Alamo Scouts, according to military accounts, were assigned to clear Lingayen for the American liberation troops. On the assist were Filipino troops. In the midst of the flurry, a group of Filipino soldiers lost their way and were accosted by blond-and-blue-eyed troops. “Take us to your commander,” the Filipinos begged. Commander of the all-American Alamo, it turned out to be, was Rocky Ileto.

Rocky joined the Philippine Army in 1950. He organized and commanded the scout rangers. From 1955 to 1958 he was posted to Saigon and Vientiane, Laos as military attache; then operations chief of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency from 1959 to 1964. By the time Marcos was elected president in 1965, Ileto was the commanding general of the First PC Zone covering all provinces north of Manila. Promoted brigadier general in 1967, Gen. Ileto was also appointed chief intelligence of the AFP.

Rocky was chief, J-2 when the Jabidah Affair was secretly planned by top-rank officers with the blessings of Marcos. Rocky displeased the god again in 1971.

Marcos, in an interview four years later, hinted cracks were showing in the AFP. He said: “Now I don’t know what’s on the minds of these generals, but I’m sure that if they go ahead with their plans, they’ll only meet with failure.”

Did Marcos take a potshot at Ileto? Rocky only smiles at the recollection. “I didn’t know what Marcos’ plans for me were until Alejandro Melchor (Marcos’ then executive secretary) called me up to ask if I was interested in a diplomat’s position. I told him, no I’m not. I told Melchor I intend to retire in a few years. I also had a little farm in Antipolo. The late General Carlos P. Romulo also called me up. Gen. Romulo told me Marcos wanted me as ambassador to Iran. What will I do in Iran? I didn’t want to leave my farm, I’d rather stay there than go to Iran. Melchor talked to me again, and again, I gave him the same reasons. Then I got a phone call from Marcos himself, offering me Iran. I said no, he said, don’t worry about your farm, Jess Tanchanco will look after it. I thought Marcos was kidding. Some months after that, I met Tanchanco, and he asked me, where is your farm that I’m supposed to take care of? I didn’t know Tanchanco was there when Marcos talked to me on the phone.”

Rocky relented in 1975. It was the graduation at the Philippine Military Academy. All the President’s generals were there, in their shining best. Marcos walked by. “He didn’t mind me at first. Then he came back. He said, O, General Ileto are you going to Iran? All the generals were looking at me. What can I say?” The next thing he knew, he was packing-off for Iran.

Rocky was ambassador to Iran, and at the same time, vice-chief of staff. “I’d come home to Manila, change into the military uniform.” Rocky’s “double-life” lasted from 1975 to 1978 when he retired from the army.

Rocky knew then that he would never make it as chief of staff, despite the fact that Gen. Espino was already on extended service. “I had some demands, and Marcos knew that. But Marcos did not believe in them.” Ileto was open about his view that officers must be promptly retired. He was vehement on non-extension. “Ambassadors and generals are retired, without exception, at age 60. But Marcos held on to extendees. The basis? Loyalty. Before Marcos, the extension was highly selective. I believed that these extendees soon will feel they owe their bread and butter to the President and not the people.”

With Rocky out of the country, there was less and less contact with Marcos. Rocky recalls Marcos’ “longest” talk with him was an overseas call to Iran during the height of the revolution, shortly before the fall of the Shah.

“Marcos called me up to relay a message to the Shah that he (Marcos) was ready to give any assistance. Marcos even urged me, ‘Gen. you are an expert in urban guerilla tactics, why don’t you help the Shah?’ Marcos talked lengthily, expressing concern for the Shah’s safety. He ordered me to offer all assistance to the Shah and his family. I was very busy securing the Filipino workers and he wanted me to help the Shah?”

Rocky says he never was able to help the Shah. Instead, he sent a note to the Shah’s office, conveying Marcos’ message. By then it was too late, the Pahlavis had fled Iran. When angry Iranians stormed the Shah’s office, among the things found was the note from Ileto conveying Marcos’ message.

The dissenter’s next assignment was Thailand. Again, it would be complete silence from Marcos until the coup d’etat last year. Marcos phoned him for developments, but did not attempt to offer any assistance.

If Marcos was not in touch with Rocky, Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, Vice-Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Fidel Ramos and a host of leaders from the Opposition and the ruling party were. For a while, it was rumored that Gen. Ileto was being groomed to be chief of staff, replacing the unpopular Gen. Ver; then, as defense minister, to replace Enrile. “That came from the KBL (Kilusang Bagong Lipunan) members during one of their caucuses. It was not my fault,” he laughs.

Sometime in 1984, Rocky came home for a visit. “I had a meeting with the ministers and they complained they had no access to the military hierarchy. They were also apprehensive that Ver would pull a coup and install himself in power. Ver must have had the idea that he had the entire armed forces.” At that time, Ramos and Enrile were on the verge of resignation from the government. Rocky played mediator, held a meeting with the two disgruntled officials.

“I merely relayed the apprehensions of the ministers, and to convince them not to resign, precisely to deter Ver from his shenanigans.” Ramos and Enrile agreed.

Rocky would meet Ramos again, this time to console the latter. Gen. Ramos was appointed acting chief of staff while Ver was under trial for complicity in the sensational Benigno Aquino assassination. “Eddie was depressed. He had the responsibility but without the corresponding authority. I felt guilty about it because he could have resigned but I persuaded him to stay.”

During his irregular visits home, the ambassador never missed an opportunity to meet with leaders — politicians, religious, professionals, and the military. The Oppositionists asked him how Iran conducted their civil disobedience; the military, how the coups were staged in Thailand. The religious were curious how religion helped topple the Shah, and so forth and so on.

The snap polls excited the cool diplomat. But he managed to stay in Bangkok, despite calls from colleagues for him to be in Manila. “I got this call from an American son-in-law of a general. He was calling from Hong Kong with a message from Gen. Jesus Vargas asking me to come home. It sounded strange. The man said Gen. Vargas can’t call me because he fears his phones were bugged. I called up Gen. Luis Villareal (in Manila) and he confirmed the man’s identity. Louie (Villareal) also reiterated Gen. Vargas’ message.” But Rocky stayed in Bangkok.

Another call would come after the elections. This time, the caller, the second in command of a government company was adamant. “He told me to pick up my plane ticket from this office. I have to be in Manila as soon as possible.” By Wednesday, Feb. 19, Rocky was home.

Rocky sat down with the leaders he had been meeting before. “It was mostly on civil disobedience stuff,” he recalls. The Sunday before, Oppositionist Corazon Aquirio had called for a nationwide boycott on several crony-related corporations, a prelude to a more massive civil disobedience in response to the fraudulent Feb. 7 elections. Rocky met with the top brass, too and the retirees in the military.

He claims now he noted nothing “really unusual”, but there was a feeling of apprehension he could not quite put his finger into. “Everybody was telling me something big was coming up where I could be of some use.” Rocky does not elaborate.

“It was like a jigsaw puzzle,” he says. On Feb. 22, the pieces started to fit. He was informed that Enrile and Ramos had announced their withdrawal of support to the Marcos government. Rocky himself received a call urging him to go to Camp Aguinaldo. By 9 p.m., he realized where he could be of use: as go-between, as one-man negotiating panel for the contending forces.

“I had only one thing in mind: to prevent bloodshed.” Rocky called up Gen. Ver. “He gave me the assurance he would not squeeze the trigger that Saturday night.” Then, tens of thousands of civilians had already ringed Camp Aguinaldo. “I was,” Rocky says, “very relieved with Ver’s assurance.”

Rocky had another proposal to Gen. Ver. “Why not bring the confrontation to the conference table? I told him this would be good for your image.” But Gen. Ver was non-committal. The die-hard Marcos loyalist was in no mood for a conference..

Rocky’s proposal was for each side to send two generals. As a neutralizer, a retired general would sit with the group, and resolve the impasse. “It was to be a purely military affair. Gen. Ver said he would inform Marcos. Later, Ver told me, the President wanted the political aspect settled too.”

Sunday was a jittery day. Gen. Ver suddenly was out of touch. Rocky had a hard time getting through. When they talked, “Ver wouldn’t give me an assurance anymore.” Reports of Marcos’ forces coming to attack Camp Aguinaldo became redundant. But none materialized.

Rocky says: “If Ver had the brains and the training as a combat soldier, he could have won that battle.”

The proposed five-man commission, explains Rocky, “was a delaying tactic. I was hoping for time, prevent bloodshed but at the same time, give Ramos and Enrile a chance to build up their forces.”

By Monday, the “rebels” intercepted Marcos’ communication: Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas, commanding general of the Philippine Army, was given the general command. Rocky motored to Fort Bonifacio. “Ramas was once my junior officer. I know him not as a combatant but as a talker. Sometimes, you have to capitalize on your foe’s glibness. I waited for him, 20 minutes, I told him about the commission, that he should be a part of that. I told him that with his persuasive ways, he could easily outmaneuver the rebels. The talks would be open to the public and that would be good for his image.”

Gen. Ramas, says Rocky, agreed but added he had to get clearance from above.

By Monday, Rocky says, he was 100 per cent sure the “rebels” had the upper hand. “Channel 4 was ours. It was very vital that we had control over the network.” He had earlier warned Gen. Ramos to secure communication installations. “In my experience, these are the first targets.” Massive “defections” were crippling the Marcos camp. But the possibility of an attack was still there.

Tuesday was an altogether different day. Suddenly, it was Gen. Ver calling Rocky. “Gen. Ver was now eager to go on with the military committee.” Gen. Ver also requested that the problem of the political aspect be included in the agenda. Rocky pressed that Crame had the bigger force, it must call the shots. Ver said he’d call again.

The “rebel’s” negotiator waited, but no call came. By sundown, however, when Rocky arrived home his wife said that Gen. Ver had called up twice already. Rocky returned the call, but Ver’s aide replied he didn’t know where his boss was. Rocky right away sensed something was wrong. “Gen. Ver always tells his aides where he was. It was not normal.” At around nine that evening, the Marcoses with a retinue of 89, including Gen. Ver and his sons, fled the country.

“Everything happened without plans. I’ve been in the military service, we don’t do things like this without planning. It’s a miracle, I think.”

People power, he says, was never like this. “I’ve seen it done in Iran. But ours was better.” He was overwhelmed.

With the awesome display of support, “things just fell into the right places”. Rocky has witnessed two coups in Thailand and how Iranian women stopped the Shah’s tanks. Yes, he smiles, he told Gen. Ramos what he saw and his analysis of those events. “But,” Rocky adds, “not Enrile.”

Time was, Rocky muses, when his four daughters chided him for not helping the country. The Ileto girls, including ramp mannequin Marissa, were regulars at the yellow rallies. “I told them just be careful, and they replied, we are doing this because you’re not doing anything Dad!”

Rocky says he’s home now, for better or for worse. Enrile has appointed him Deputy Minister for National Defense. Rocky’s foremost task, he announced, was to trim the ministry of “excess fat”, merging offices with duplicating functions, maximizing the ministry’s capacity with the least expenses.

Ever the soldier, Rocky’s last words are about the military.” “Gen Ver was the biggest factor in bringing down the military.” How much damage was done? Rocky pauses: “I can’t put it into words.”